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Abstract
Peer review is often taken to be the main form of quality control
on academic research. Usually journals carry this out. However, parts
of math and physics appear to have a parallel, crowd-sourced model
of peer review, where papers are posted on the arXiv to be publicly
discussed. In this paper we argue that crowd-sourced peer review is
likely to do better than journal-solicited peer review at sorting papers
by quality. Our argument rests on two key claims. First, crowd-
sourced peer review will lead on average to more reviewers per paper
than journal-solicited peer review. Second, due to the wisdom of the
crowds, more reviewers will tend to make better judgments than fewer.
We make the second claim precise by looking at the Condorcet Jury
Theorem as well as two related jury theorems developed specifically
to apply to peer review.
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1 Introduction
Peer review is supposed to secure an epistemic benefit. By ensuring that only
work that has been validated by multiple experts is allowed into the academic
literature, peer review is commonly thought to function as a quality control
that prevents us from wasting time on poor work. Rather than have to wade
through every half-baked flight of fancy, a discerning researcher may simply
peruse peer-reviewed journals and read only that which passes peer review.
However, in this essay we argue that an open, ‘crowd-sourced’ approach to
peer review is more likely to reliably identify high-quality work compared to
traditional, journal-solicited peer review.
The widely practices journal-solicited approach to peer-review filters the
quality of academic work through a small number of experts—typically, a few
editors and one to three outside referees. The normative assumption that ap-
pears to underlie this practice is the belief that a small number of experts
(reading anonymized submissions) are the best mechanism for distinguishing
between high-quality and low-quality work. In this system, quality assess-
ment occurs in two stages: first, in pre-publication peer review, which sorts
papers into journals; and second, by a journal’s readership post-publication.
We take it that the first stage is intended to provide a proxy for the sec-
ond, i.e., the more long-term assessment by the field. In this paper, we
argue that a ‘crowd-sourced’ approach to peer review that bypasses the first
stage—immediately opening up papers for evaluations by large numbers of
readers—is likely to more reliably evaluate paper quality than the traditional
model of peer review. In brief, we use the Condorcet jury theorem (Con-
dorcet 1785) and some closely related mathematical results to argue that
a large number of evaluators is more likely to produce an accurate quality
assessment of a paper than a smaller number of evaluators.
While we offer up some specifics of an open, crowd-sourced peer-review
system, this paper is not intended to provide a full outline of such a system.
In §3–6 we offer enough of the details to make our comparative case. In §7,
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while considering some objections, we gesture to some further features one
may wish to incorporate into such a system. For instance, one possibility
we note is that in addition to crowd-sourcing from the academic community
at large, it might be desirable to have a core of expert reviewers whose
assessments are recorded separately. So, while we do not rest our case on such
specifics of a crowd-sourced model, we are often (as in this case) supportive
of particular proposals for how such a system might work. In our view, an
experimental attitude to crowd-sourcing peer review will be a much better
way to work out the details than any argument we could provide here.
We close this introduction by relating our argument to the previous lit-
erature. There is renewed interest in the epistemic benefits secured by large
numbers of diverse agents (List and Goodin 2001, Hartmann and Sprenger
2012), including in the social epistemology of science (Heesen et al. 2019,
O’Connor and Bruner 2019, Singer 2019). Our intent is to bring this liter-
ature to bear on a concrete problem in the social epistemology of science,
namely peer review. Further, given the replication crisis, there has recently
been interest in systematic failures of peer review (Romero 2016, Heesen
2018). Our paper offers a thoroughgoing solution to these problems. Like
those who argue we should eliminate peer review in the context of project
funding (Avin 2019), we think we should abandon the idea that a small num-
ber of experts can reliably predict which ideas will be worth reading. We are
not the first to suggest opening up peer review (see, e.g., Gibson 2007, Nosek
and Bar-Anan 2012, Heesen and Bright forthcoming). However, we offer a
novel argument for its epistemic benefits. If our argument is sound, noth-
ing should get a potentially deceptive stamp of authority through journal-
solicited peer review. Instead, to gauge the quality of academic work, we
should rely on the long-run and aggregated views of many diverse researchers.
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2 Assumptions of Peer Review
Our purpose is to compare the present system of journal-solicited pre-pub-
lication peer review against a crowd-sourced model. However, we expressly
do not engage in an all-things-considered comparison. Rather, we focus on
one goal of peer review (central to its defenders): namely the selection of
high-quality papers. Thus we set aside other goals, such as improving the
quality of papers.
In this section we argue that if the present system of peer review really
helps us pick out high-quality papers (however imperfectly), then research
quality and the peer reviewers who assess it must satisfy certain assumptions.
Our argument’s structure is loosely analogous to a transcendental deduction:
we argue that without satisfying these assumptions, the idea that any form
of peer review could successfully select for quality makes no sense. The two
assumptions are competency and intersubjectivity.
Let us begin with the competency assumption. We assume that re-
searchers are at least better than chance at picking out papers of high quality
or ranking papers according quality. The significance of this assumption is
just that quality is the sort of thing which a peer reviewer is capable of
discerning. If this were false, then the current system could do no better
than a system of random publication. So quality is the sort of thing which
researchers can and do discern, and respond appropriately to given their
reviewing task.
The second assumption is that there exists broad (if rough) intersubjective
agreement about what constitutes quality. The idea is that for any given
academic paper, there is a unique notion of quality: one way of being the
best version of that paper which readers and reviewers should track. Note
that we are not saying that there is only one type of quality for all papers.
Rather, we are assuming that once you fix facts about a paper’s topic and
the type of impact it is intended to have, then there is a uniquely best way
of fulfilling the paper’s purpose.
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Even when relativized in this way, a unidimensional notion of quality in-
vites skepticism. Kuhn (1977, chapter 13) emphasized that there are many
respects in which a scientific theory (and by extension a scientific paper)
might be judged good or bad, and different reviewers will weigh these dif-
ferently (see also Okasha 2011, Heesen 2019, for a more formal approach to
this issue).
However, consider what would be the case if our assumption were false.
If there is no intersubjectively agreed unidimensional notion of quality, then
it is unclear what peer review is doing. Why should the fact that reviewers
like a paper give me any reason to think that I will like it? The fact that
we assume that peer reviewers can assess quality and make useful judgments
about what is worth spending time on belies a presupposition: namely, that
for any given paper the relevant experts know what it would take to be a
more or less worthy version of that paper, and that we can reasonably expect
some agreement on this point. We allow, and in fact it will be essential
to our argument, that this agreement may be partial and accompanied by
substantive and persistent disagreement on particular points.
Moreover, the assumption of an intersubjectively agreed notion of quality
is deeply entangled in many academic practices. Decisions about hiring,
tenure, and promotion are at least partially based on the journals researchers
have published in. This practice assumes that better journals are more likely
to publish better papers, which in turn assumes that something worth caring
about can be learned from peer reviewers’ assessment. Thus anyone whose
opinion on anything has been influenced by where something was published
is implicitly committed to intersubjectivity and competence. Hence, if peer
review is to make sense as a system of quality control, then the following
features must be in place: Paper quality is such that for any given paper
there is a unique best way it could fulfill its own potential, and the research
community contains people who are competent to assess this.
While our focus is exclusively on the role of peer review in quality control,
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we feel it is useful at this stage to briefly discuss fairness considerations. Pro-
ponents of journal-solicited peer review often suggest that our current prac-
tices are the fairest method available, as a particular feature of the existing
peer review process—anonymization—is vital for protecting against reviewer
bias. We take no stance on anonymization. Our arguments instead support
the following conditional claims: if anonymization is important for fairness
in peer review, then an anonymized crowd-sourced peer review process would
be superior to current processes; and if anonymization is unimportant, then
a non-anonymized crowd-sourced peer review process would be superior. Ei-
ther way, our point stands: an open, crowd-sourced method of peer review
is likely to more accurately judge paper quality than journal-solicited peer
review.
3 Crowd-sourcing More Reviewers
One notable feature of journal-solicited peer review is that paper quality is
judged by a small number of evaluators. First, papers are often read and
‘desk-rejected’ by a single editor. Second, when papers are sent out for
review, they are typically reviewed by anywhere from one to three refer-
ees. Contrast this system to the crowd-sourced peer review system already
utilized in math and physics. In these disciplines, it is standard for un-
published papers to be posted on individuals’ professional websites and on
central repositories, such as the arXiv. It also appears to be a disciplinary
norm for members of the academic profession to read and publicly evaluate
new submissions.
Evidence for this norm in math and physics is anecdotal, as there are no
formal studies of how widely arXiv preprints are discussed prior to journal
publication. However, the evidence is suggestive. Prominent weblogs in
both fields hosted by experts (PhDs and tenured faculty) routinely discuss
and evaluate new arXiv preprints in detail, including in comment sections,
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where additional experts often weigh in.1 Widespread discussions of arXiv
preprints, including blog posts and subsequent arXiv preprints criticizing
earlier preprints, lead to broader judgments in the discipline about the quality
of particular papers before publication in any journal.
It is not merely well-known figures whose preprints are discussed. For ex-
ample, in 2007, a PhD researcher in physics who had left academia posted an
arXiv preprint entitled “An Exceptionally Simple Theory of Everything” (Lisi
2007). Despite having no academic post, Lisi’s paper was discussed at ma-
jor physics blogs2 and in further arXiv preprints (e.g., Distler and Garibaldi
2009). This process of online discussion led to a disciplinary consensus that
Lisi’s paper is flawed.3 In 2012 a well-known mathematician posted drafts of
four preprints on his website, totaling around 500 pages, claiming to prove
the abc conjecture (Mochizuki 2012a,b,c,d). A flurry of discussion on blogs
and in followup preprints followed, identifying and debating potential flaws
with the proof.4
As we see in these and other cases, the evaluation of paper quality is
more widely distributed in math and physics. If it is generally expected in
an academic profession—as in math and physics—that unpublished preprints
should be read and discussed publicly before publication, then chances are
high that under crowd-sourced peer review, the average paper will be re-
viewed by a larger number of reviewers than in a journal-solicited system.
It is worth noting that this does not necessarily require the overall time
1Examples in physics include A Quantum Diaries Survivor (https://www.science-
20.com/a_quantum_diaries_survivor), Of Particular Significance (https://profmatt-
strassler.com), and Backreaction (http://backreaction.blogspot.com). Examples
in math include Terence Tao’s blog (https://terrytao.wordpress.com) and Persiflage
(https://www.galoisrepresentations.com).
2E.g., http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2007/11/theoretically-simple-ex-
ception-of.html.
3See https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/wipeout-theory.
4See Scholze and Stix (2018) and https://www.galoisrepresentations.com/
2017/12/17/the-abc-conjecture-has-still-not-been-proved for discussion of
the mathematical content and https://twitter.com/andrewaberdein/status/
1246553878553939980 for a timeline.
7
spent reviewing papers to increase. Suppose that the current disciplinary
norm to volunteer one’s time to review papers for journals is shifted over
to the new system of crowd-sourced peer review, such that each member of
the academic community volunteers exactly the same amount of time and
reviews the same number of papers. Under journal-solicited peer review,
journals base their decision about the quality of a paper only on the reviews
solicited by that journal. For those papers that have already been rejected
from other journals, all previous reviews are normally ignored. In contrast,
under crowd-sourced peer review all reviews are public. Thus, if the total
number of reviews remains constant, the average number of actually available
reviews per paper under crowd-sourced peer review will be higher than under
journal-solicited peer review.
We will assume throughout the rest of this paper that moving to crowd-
sourced peer review increases the average number of reviews per paper. For
a reader who thinks that crowd-sourced peer review will lower the number of
reviews per paper, the arguments presented below will favor journal-solicited
peer review over crowd-sourced peer review. However, they could also be
read as a normative argument in favor of increasing the average number of
evaluators of any given paper.
4 The Basic Condorcet Jury Theorem
In this section and the next two, we provide formal arguments that having
more reviewers is likely to lead to superior decisions. Our argument in this
section is an application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
The Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that, subject to three assumptions,
the judgments of a jury—a group charged with voting on the truth of a
proposition (where a majority vote wins)—have a greater probability of ac-
curacy the greater the number of people in the jury. The first assumption is
that there is a correct answer : the proposition the jury is judging is either
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true or false. The second assumption is that every member of the jury has
some probability of voting for the correct truth-value of the proposition that
is probabilistically independent of the other jury members’ vote. Finally, the
third assumption is that the average5 probability that any individual in the
jury votes correctly is greater than .5. The theorem then says that adding
more voters to the pool (keeping the average probability of voting correctly
constant) makes it progressively less likely that the majority vote for the
wrong conclusion.
Here is a brief, intuitive illustration of the theorem. Suppose the average
probability that a juror votes for the right answer is .51. If only 100 people
serve on the jury, then the most likely result is that 51 jury members will
vote for the correct answer and 49 for the wrong answer. If, however, just
one additional jury member votes wrongly, then the result will be a tie. And
if two additional jury members vote wrongly, then the jury will vote 51-49 for
the wrong verdict. So it is not unlikely for this jury to go wrong (this happens
with a probability of approximately .38, with an additional .08 probability of
a tie). Now consider a jury of 100, 000. If the average probability of a correct
vote remains .51, the most likely result is that 51, 000 jury members will
vote for the right verdict and 49, 000 for the wrong verdict. Consequently,
a thousand additional jury members would have to make a mistake to shift
the jury from the single most likely outcome to the wrong result. But this
occurs only with a probability of around one in ten billion.
The theorem also shows that in the limit (an infinite-sized jury), the
majority will vote for the correct answer with probability one (i.e., 100 % of
the time). The relevant point for our purposes, however, is the comparative
claim: the more jury members there are, the more likely it is that a majority
of them will vote for the correct answer. This is important in light of our
assumption that the typical article in a crowd-sourced peer review model
will be read and evaluated by more people than under journal-solicited peer
5This generalizes the original theorem by allowing individual probabilities to vary.
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review.
To see how the Condorcet Jury Theorem plausibly supports crowd-sourced
peer review, compare the assumptions of the theorem to those discussed in
§2. The theorem’s first assumption is that the proposition being judged is
true or false. In the case of peer review this proposition would be some-
thing like ‘This paper is of high quality’. This aligns closely with the second
assumption we argued peer review must satisfy, i.e., that there is an intersub-
jective quality standard for a paper on a particular topic. For the moment we
are assuming that peer reviewers give (only) a binary judgment of quality:
thumbs up or thumbs down. One of the motivations of the models in §5–6
is to consider more informative, graded reviewer judgments.
Now consider the Condorcet theorem’s second assumption: that every
jury member has an independent probability of voting for the correct result.
This assumption does not correspond directly to one of the assumptions
from §2. Under crowd-sourced peer review, we can imagine reviewers’ judg-
ments becoming correlated due to reviewers being able to read other reviews,
whereas under journal-solicited peer review, the active hand of an editor may
likewise induce correlation of reviewers’ judgments. So whether the indepen-
dence assumption is satisfied may well depend on the mechanism by which
the different peer review systems are implemented. We will say more about
steps a crowd-sourced peer review model could take to ensure reviewer in-
dependence in §7.1 and §7.3. For now we emphasize that independence is
assumed in the Condorcet Jury Theorem, and hence the real-world applica-
bility of our argument in this section hinges on providing a mechanism to
guarantee it.
Finally, consider the Condorcet theorem’s third assumption: that on aver-
age voters’ probability of voting for the correct answer is better than chance.
This corresponds to the first assumption we argued that peer review must
satisfy: that reviewers are competent at picking out high-quality papers.
Our claim is that, for peer review to reliably select papers for publication
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on the basis of quality, two of the three assumptions of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem must be satisfied. Moreover, the third assumption (independence)
will be satisfied by crowd-sourced peer review if the latter is carefully im-
plemented (we defer our discussion of this to §7). But then a crowd-sourced
peer review model is more reliable than a journal-solicited peer review model.
For we have argued in §3 that crowd-sourced peer review will tend to base
evaluations on the judgment of a larger jury than journal-solicited peer re-
view. And by the Condorcet Jury Theorem a larger jury is more likely to
arrive at an accurate evaluation.
5 A Jury Theorem for Reviewer Scores
In the previous section we argued that the crowd-sourced method of peer
review is superior to the present system on the basis of an ‘off the shelf’
application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. While we find this argument
convincing, we recognize that the basic Condorcet model is highly idealized
and thereby open to objections. In this section we provide a new model
intended to be more tailored to the specifics of peer review, and show that
an analogous theorem holds in this model. This shows that the jury theorem
is robust against certain changes in its assumptions, thus strengthening our
argument.
The basic Condorcet model assumes that agents make a binary judgment
on a single proposition. In contrast, real peer reviewers provide more nuanced
judgments. These may come in the form of numerical scores or qualitative
reasons for the reviewer’s verdict. This section considers a model of peer
review where reviewers only provide a numerical score; we add qualitative
reasons in the next section.
Whereas in the previous section the goal was to evaluate the truth value
of the proposition ‘This paper is of high quality’, now the goal is to rank
papers, with those ranked highest most recommended to the attention of
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other researchers. By the intersubjectivity assumption, for any two papers,
one can accurately be said to be of higher quality than another.
Each review consists of a numerical score, which is the reviewer’s estimate
of the paper’s quality. We write qi for the quality estimate provided by
reviewer i. By the competence assumption, reviewers tend to give higher
scores to better papers. But as in the previous section, we assume that there
is some random variation in reviewer scores, reflecting individual reviewer
biases and idiosyncrasies. Also as in the previous section, we assume that this
variation is independent across reviewers, so reviewer scores can be modeled
as independent random draws from a large pool of potential reviewers or
reviewer scores (we refer again to §7.3 for more discussion of the independence
assumption).
In this setup, we can represent the competence assumption by assuming
that, on average, reviewers agree on the quality of a paper (that is, for
each paper there is a number q such that E[qi] = q for all i). And we
can represent reviewer biases and idiosyncrasies by assuming that there is
some random variation around this average (Var[qi] = σ2 > 0 for all i).
The intersubjectivity assumption is reflected in the different average for each
paper (if qi and ri are reviewer i’s scores for distinct papers, the former is
intersubjectively better if E[qi] > E[ri]).
Given differing quality estimates from reviewers that are each taken to
be competent, it seems reasonable for a journal editor or arXiv reader to
take the average of these estimates to be her best estimate of the relative
quality of a paper. Averaging in this way has been defended in the literature
on combining forecasts (Clemen 1989, Armstrong 2001, especially p. 422)
and peer disagreement (Elga 2007, Christensen 2007, Cohen 2013), while
(weighted) linear averaging more generally has also been widely defended
by formal epistemologists (Lehrer and Wagner 1981, Martini and Sprenger
2017, Pettigrew 2019). So the quantity of interest that will be used to make
decisions under either journal-solicited or crowd-sourced peer review is the
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average of n reviewer scores q1, q2, . . . , qn, which may be written 1n
∑n
i=1 qi.6
Because individual reviewer scores are equal in expectation, so is the aver-
age reviewer score (that is, E[ 1
n
∑n
i=1 qi] = E[q1]). Perhaps more importantly,
the random variation in the average reviewer score will decrease as the num-
ber of reviewers increases, according to the formula Var[ 1
n
∑n
i=1 qi] = σ2/n.
This means that the more reviewers there are, the smaller the probability
that the average reviewer score will be much different from its expectation.
Since better papers have a higher expectation, the probability that two pa-
pers are ranked incorrectly will similarly decrease.
This gives us a clear analogy to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Previously,
increasing the number of reviewers increased the probability of a correct ver-
dict, whereas here increasing the number of reviewers increases the probabil-
ity that papers are ranked correctly. To complete the analogy, note that the
random variation will reduce to zero in the limit as the number of reviewers
becomes infinite, meaning that papers are ranked correctly with probability
one.
Once again, granted the assumption that crowd-sourced peer review will
have on average more reviewers per paper than journal-solicited peer review,
this yields an argument in favor of crowd-sourced peer review as more likely
to yield accurate quality judgments.
6A potential objection here is that the average is only a meaningful quantity if reviewer
scores are assumed to be measured on a cardinal scale, whereas arguably such judgments
only have ordinal significance (see Tal 2020, section 3.2 for background on this classifi-
cation). This need not always be a problem in practice. For example, if the underlying
distribution is symmetric, the mean coincides with the median, which is ordinally mean-
ingful, so the average will ‘accidentally’ track something meaningful. But to address this
worry more fully we might take the median of reviewer scores as the quantity of interest
instead. If we change our assumptions appropriately (individual reviewer scores share
a median, with a higher median for better papers), essentially the same argument goes
through, as the variance of the median of reviewer scores will also decrease with more
reviewers. Moreover, if we assume reviewer scores are discrete rather than continuous, the
jury theorem for the median proven by Morreau (forthcoming) applies, so our argument
goes through in that setting as well. Working with the median has another advantage: it
is robust against outliers. We recommend using both where feasible (see §7.1). We thank
Michael Morreau for suggesting both the objection and the response.
13
6 A Jury Theorem for Reviewer Reasons
In this section we expand on the previous section’s model by including re-
viewers’ reasons for giving a particular (numerical) quality judgment. We
represent these reasons by thinking of papers as having a number of features
and peer reviewers as having opinions on which combinations of features
make for a high-quality paper. More specifically, we assume there are m fea-
tures that peer reviewers evaluate for a paper on a certain topic (recall that
quality standards are paper-specific). A paper is represented by its feature
coordinates x1, x2, . . . , xm, which provide a numerical ‘score’ for how that pa-
per does on each feature. We imagine that for each feature there is a ‘golden
mean’ (possibly relative to the value of the other features) such that both
more and less of that feature would make the paper worse in the eyes of the
reviewer.
For example, say that for a given paper feature 1 concerns the paper’s
discussion of the external validity of its results, so x1 indicates how the
paper scores on this feature. A low value of x1 might indicate that the
discussion unnecessarily constrains the external validity (compared to what
is justified per the scores on other features); a high value then says that
the discussion generalizes the study’s results too widely (i.e., in ways not
sufficiently supported by the evidence). A medium value indicates a sensible
discussion that avoids unsupported claims.
What might the set of features look like? Since our argument goes through
regardless, we can remain agnostic between the following suggestions. First,
the features might be Kuhn’s criteria for theory choice: empirical adequacy,
simplicity, etc. Second, the features might be some variation on those that
peer reviewers are explicitly asked to score papers on by journals: novelty,
methodological soundness, etc. Third, our preferred option, the features
might be anything and everything peer reviewers use to evaluate papers, at
as fine-grained a level as possible.
According to our intersubjectivity assumption, any given paper has an
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(intersubjectively agreed) quality. We conceive of both a paper’s quality
and any given reviewer’s opinion of its quality as a function of that paper’s
feature coordinates x1, . . . , xm. Quality can then be characterized as some-
thing that looks like an epistemic landscape (in the sense of Weisberg and
Muldoon 2009, Alexander et al. 2015, Thoma 2015): each m-dimensional
point x = (x1, . . . , xm) represents a possible paper, and the height of the
landscape at that point is the quality of that paper. We define the function
f : Rm → [0,∞) to describe this epistemic landscape. That is, f(x) is the
intersubjective quality of a paper with characteristics x.
In accordance with our competence assumption, peer reviewers (whether
crowd-sourced or journal-solicited) can estimate the quality of a paper. How-
ever, they are not perfect. First, they may be biased in that the combinations
of features they perceive to indicate high quality are different from the com-
binations that really constitute intersubjective quality. Second, there may
be measurement error, i.e., peer reviewers may make mistakes in evaluating
a paper on some or all features. We roll these two types of errors into a
single bias bi for a given reviewer i. The bias bi is an m-dimensional point
representing the total distortion in reviewer i’s estimation of quality, such
that the reviewer’s quality estimate for a paper with characteristics x will be
f(x+ bi).
We denote by µ the center of mass of the epistemic landscape of in-
tersubjective quality, and assume that this quantity exists.7 Consequently,
for any reviewer i, the epistemic landscape characterizing how that reviewer
estimates quality also has a center of mass located at µ− bi.
As before, we assume that a journal editor or reader takes the average of
7More formally, we assume
∫
Rm xjf(x) dx is finite for each feature j and define µ
coordinate-wise by µj =
∫
Rm xjf(x) dx/
∫
Rm f(x) dx. Given our ‘golden mean’ approach
to paper quality, this assumption is fairly innocent. It holds in particular if f has a finite
maximum (as it does under any reasonable formalization of the ‘golden mean’ approach)
and the features are measured on finite scales. If the features are measured on infinite
scales, whether the assumption holds depends on how quickly quality drops off away from
the maximum.
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these estimates to be her best estimate of the quality of a paper. So for a
paper x reviewed by n reviewers the editor’s or reader’s quality estimate is
fn(x) = 1n
∑n
i=1 f(x+ bi).
Also as before, we assume that crowd-sourced peer review will lead (on
average) to more reviewers per paper than journal-solicited peer review. The
question then is whether this improves the quality estimate. For a given pa-
per x, this translates in the model to the question whether fn(x) gets closer
to f(x) as n increases. Depending on the shape of the landscape and review-
ers’ biases, this may be true for some values of x and false for others. What
we would like to know, then, is whether for an arbitrary paper the quality
estimate gets closer to the intersubjective quality with more reviewers, i.e.,
whether the function fn as a whole becomes more similar to the function f
as n increases.
How do we characterize the similarity of two functions? Here we take
the following approach: compare the centers of mass. The center of mass
measures the central tendency of a function, giving some indication of where
in the landscape the highest peaks of quality occur. This is a fairly crude
measure of similarity: two functions may have the same center of mass but
be dissimilar in other respects. However, it has the advantage of giving us a
single number (or m-dimensional point, rather) for each function. This mea-
sure works well when the landscapes are single-peaked and mostly smooth,
as two such landscapes with similar centers of mass will usually agree on
relative judgments (i.e., which of two papers is better). The center of mass
of fn is µ− 1n
∑n
i=1 bi, which we compare to µ, the center of mass of f .
Now we just need to worry about how the reviewer biases are distributed.
We assume that we can treat these as random variables. This need only be
true in a subjective sense: the bias of a given reviewer is random insofar as
you do not know in advance which reviewer and hence which bias will be
selected. We assume that expected bias is zero (loosely speaking, this says
that bias is equally likely to be in any direction) and expected variation in
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bias is finite.8
It follows that in expectation the center of mass of estimated quality is
equal to the center of mass of intersubjective quality (E[µ− 1
n
∑n
i=1 bi] = µ),
that is, on average there will be no bias at all. But assuming the biases
of different reviewers are independent (see §7.3 for discussion), we also get
that the probabilistic variation in the center of mass of estimated quality
decreases with the number of reviewers (Cov[µ − 1
n
∑n
i=1 bi] = Σ/n). This
means that the center of mass of estimated quality is more likely to be far
away from the center of mass of intersubjective quality if there are fewer
reviewers, and more likely to be close if there are more. Moreover, since the
variation reduces to zero in the limit, µ− 1
n
∑n
i=1 bi probabilistically converges
to µ.
These results provide another close parallel to the Condorcet Jury Theo-
rem. Estimated quality is likely to be closer to intersubjective quality as the
number of reviewers increases, and they coincide (by our fairly crude mea-
sure) in the infinite limit. We conclude that crowd-sourced peer review, inso-
far as it tends to involve a greater number of reviewers, outperforms journal-
solicited peer review even when we grant the basic assumptions (competency
and intersubjectivity) that are required for journal-solicited peer review to
make sense.
7 Replies to Potential Objections
We anticipate several objections, each focusing on a different background
assumption.
8More formally, we assume (for all i) that E[bi] = 0 and Cov[bi] = Σ. Here, 0 is the
m-dimensional origin, and Σ gives the covariances between a particular reviewer’s bias in
each of the m features (not the covariances between different reviewers’ biases). In virtue
of being the covariance matrix, Σ is a symmetric and positive semi-definite m×m matrix.
We make no assumptions on Σ except that it is not the zero matrix.
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7.1 Manipulation of Reviewer Scores?
Our assumptions of reviewer competence and independence of reviewer judg-
ments would not be plausible for crowd-sourced peer review if it is over-
whelmed by internet trolls with a political agenda or other forms of organized
manipulation. If people base their judgment of a paper on reasons orthogonal
to its quality, then our reviewer competence assumption will not be satisfied.
If groups of people are mobilized to leave reviews of a paper without much
thought, then our independence assumption fails. Note that the latter will
be a problem for our independence assumption regardless of whether such a
‘mass reviewing campaign’ is ultimately motivated by scientific (e.g., a large
research program ganging up on a smaller one), political, or other reasons.
This is an important worry for crowd-sourced peer review given the extent
to which various social media have recently been overwhelmed by such phe-
nomena.
It is tempting to address this issue by putting tight restrictions on who is
allowed to review. There are a number of ways of doing this. We might use
formal requirements such as possession of a doctorate or academic employ-
ment, or social requirements such as endorsement from existing reviewers or
reviews rated sufficiently helpful by other reviewers. We might apply such
requirements at a system-wide level (i.e., to decide whether a given person is
allowed to review anything at all) or at a subfield-specific level, e.g., requiring
a doctorate in a specific subfield or endorsement from subfield specialists to
be allowed to review papers in that subfield.
As explained below, there may be ways of testing whether such restric-
tions are necessary, and if so, what types of restrictions would function best.
However, our current opinion is that such restrictions go against the spirit
of the proposal of crowd-sourced peer review and will limit its advantages.
Restricting who is allowed to review will lower the average number of reviews
per paper, thus reducing the benefits from large numbers we have discussed.
Moreover, such restrictions may reinforce existing disciplinary boundaries
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and subfield-level groupthink (where it exists), whereas one of the key en-
visioned strengths of crowd-sourced peer review is that it will be easier for
disparate fields to cross-pollinate, benefit from each other’s insights, and
correct each other’s biases.
For these reasons we favor a system in which anyone is allowed to review
anything, regardless of whether they are a recognized expert or even an
academic. But this does not mean giving free rein to trolls, mobs, and other
manipulation. We think there are various possible measures to guard against
these.
Here is a relatively simple one. For each subfield, curate a set of ex-
pert reviewers along the lines suggested above, e.g., have reviewers endorse
each other’s expertise in the given subfield. Here we imagine subfields to
be relatively small, say, more than twenty but less than a hundred endorsed
reviewers per subfield. Then, for each paper, report both the overall aver-
age reviewer score and the average expert reviewer score when taking into
account only reviewers endorsed for that particular subfield.
This system, familiar from the film review website Rotten Tomatoes—
which reports qualified reviewer scores and general audience scores—has a
number of advantages. Researchers who prefer something close to journal-
solicited peer review can use the expert reviewer average, whereas those
favoring the wisdom of the crowds can focus on the overall average. More
importantly, one can look at both. When they are similar, either there
were little or no non-expert reviewers, or the non-expert reviewers tended to
agree with the expert reviewers. It gets interesting when there is significant
divergence between the expert reviewer average and the overall average. This
could be evidence of a mob coming in to manipulate the score. However, it
could also be evidence of groupthink within the subfield, exposed by the
independent insights of outsiders. In any case, the divergent scores will be a
signal that something is up (Nosek and Bar-Anan 2012, p. 238). Individual
readers will be alerted that at least one of the scores is misleading and that
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blind reliance on averages is not advisable for this particular paper. Such
readers would be encouraged to read and judge the paper for themselves,
potentially leaving new, genuine reviews clarifying the epistemic contribution
of the paper.
More generally, while we argue that using the overall average reviewer
score from crowd-sourced peer review will give better quality judgments than
journal-solicited peer review, it is emphatically not part of our proposal that
overall average scores should be the only thing available. A lot of additional
information should be made available to potential readers, so they can freely
choose which metrics they think are more informative. This includes the
median and mode of reviewer scores, the content and score of each individual
review, the total number of reviews and the number of reviews by endorsed
reviewers, the ranking of the paper relative to other papers in its subfield,
and ratings of the helpfulness of individual reviewers.
Combining metrics will provide additional insight relevant to the prob-
lem of manipulation. For example, the median reviewer score is robust to
manipulation as long as less than half the reviewer scores are manipulated.
Thus, papers with big gaps between the average score and the median score
should be treated with care. For another example, one would typically ex-
pect better papers to receive more reviews, as readers are attracted by the
high score. Thus, papers with an unusually high number of reviews but a low
average score should raise suspicions. The same thing goes for a paper where
most of the reviews come from reviewers who have never reviewed anything
else. Using this information, we think academics will be able to make use
of crowd-sourced peer review to identify and read high-quality papers with
minimal interference from manipulation.
There may also be technological or procedural ways to monitor and pre-
vent internet mobbing and the like. First, statistical software might be used
to detect highly-correlated votes (as might be the case when a particular arti-
cle initially receives a good proportion of positive reviews only to be followed
20
by a quick succession of overwhelmingly negative reviews). Second, reviewers
might be afforded the ability to ‘flag’ particular reviews as suspicious.
Third, the proprietors or ‘section editors’ of the arXiv-like site we propose
could be alerted by their site’s software to a large number of reviews for a
given paper being posted by visitors from particular outside websites (such as
a Reddit or Twitter thread advocating for ‘review bombing’ the paper). Al-
though we would not necessarily advocate deleting suspicious reviews (which
Rotten Tomatoes did in early 2019)—as suspicious reviews could well be
genuine—proprietors could flag individual papers as potential victims of il-
licit reviewer behavior, alerting other readers and reviewers to the possibility
that the paper’s scores may be corrupted.
Fourth, moderation to remove abusive (for instance sexist or otherwise
bigoted) reviews is within the spirit of our proposal. Such reviews would not
add to the evaluation of the paper. However, in addition to their intrinsic
cultural or moral harm, they could harm the epistemic performance of science
by contributing to some groups being less able to have their claims fairly
assessed by the scientific community. Whatever potential for abuse of power
exists in this content moderation system is surely no worse than what present
editors and reviewers have.
To be clear, although we think these interventions might be effective,
we do not commit to any particular scheme for addressing illicit reviewing
practices. These matters are probably best addressed through practical ex-
perimentation of the sort that review aggregators like Rotten Tomatoes have
and continue to do.
On that note, we are optimistic that our model’s viability and any imple-
mentation issues could be examined empirically. One possibility would be for
a central repository to roll out a ‘beta’ version of the system, implementing
the model we outline above in a specific subfield, recruiting a batch of expert
reviewers in that subfield, randomly selecting new unpublished manuscripts
to receive reviews and ratings, and permitting those manuscripts to be re-
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viewed and rated by expert reviewers and others.
If this beta is rolled out prominently, it might encourage participation
from significant numbers of people in the profession. Such a trial could run
for six months or longer. In addition to gaining feedback from the aca-
demic community on what works well and what does not, the implementers
could collect data for statistical analysis over several years (say, 1–3 years).
They might use citation counts and other measures of engagement to look at
whether papers rated well by expert reviewers and general readership tend
to have a greater impact on the field than low-rated papers. Or they might
use textual analysis to see whether follow-up work by other authors is largely
positive (constructive) or negative (critical), how this correlates with reviewer
ratings, and how this compares to papers published using journal-solicited
peer review. Although scientific quality is difficult to gauge, this could pro-
vide systematic statistical evidence (albeit defeasible) of whether the trial
system tends to select higher-quality work than traditional peer review. Fur-
ther betas (implementing tweaks in response to feedback) could be carried
out and examined if the data appears promising.
7.2 Greater Average Competence in Journal-Solicited
Peer Review?
Our arguments assumed that reviewer competence is randomly distributed
throughout the population of possible reviewers. More specifically, in §4 we
assumed that the average probability that a reviewer in journal-solicited peer
review will arrive at an accurate judgment of a paper’s merit is the same
as the average probability of an accurate judgment from a crowd-sourced
reviewer. Similarly, in §5–6 we assumed that the judgment of a randomly
selected peer reviewer follows the same probability distribution whether the
reviewer is journal-solicited or crowd-sourced.
However, some may doubt this. First, some might suggest that journal
editors are likely to select substantially more competent reviewers than the
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average reviewer in the population, e.g., by commissioning reviews from the
most accomplished figures in the field. These reviewers, due to their ex-
ceptional achievements, may perhaps be expected to judge a given paper’s
merits more accurately or with less bias.9 Second, some might argue that
insofar as journal-solicited peer review commissions reviews by specialists in
the paper’s field, those specialists are likely to have higher accuracy or be less
biased than a pool of reviewers that includes non-specialists. If as a result of
either mechanism journal-solicited peer review reliably selects reviewers who
are more competent than crowd-sourced peer review, then our arguments do
not go through. In order to successfully defend a Condorcet-style argument
in this case, we would need to show that the accuracy increase generated by
increasing the size of the jury pool (through crowd-sourced peer review) is
greater than the accuracy increase generated by how journal editors select
reviewers.
Our reply to this concern is two-fold. First, the balance of present ev-
idence suggests the empirical claim that journals select better reviewers is
not true. Second, there are a number of prima facie reasons to believe that
journal-solicited reviewers are likely to be more biased than the population
from which crowd-sourced peer review might draw.
Arguments that journal-solicited reviewers are likely to be more compe-
tent to evaluate papers than readers at large tend to come from the armchair.
However, two sources of empirical evidence collectively cast doubt on this in-
tuition. First, empirical studies on the quality of journal-solicited reviews
suggest very low interrater reliability (Lee et al. 2013, pp. 5–6; Bornmann
2011, p. 207). Interrater reliability measures the level of agreement between
different reviewers judging the same paper, which is relevant here because
disagreement imposes an upper bound on reviewer accuracy. In one study,
interrater reliability barely exceeded chance (Kravitz et al. 2010). In terms
9See https://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2018/12/incentivizing-
better-reviewer-behavior.html, where David Bourget notes that journal editors may
aim to select more accomplished, senior scholars as reviewers for this reason.
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of the basic Condorcet model, this corresponds to probabilities of voting
correctly barely exceeding .5.
Second, anecdotal reports suggest that reviewers at highly-selective jour-
nals routinely misjudge papers that larger audiences have judged more accu-
rately. Gans and Shepherd (1994) report how a variety of classic (including
Nobel Prize-winning) economics articles were systemically rejected by top-
ranked journals in the field. Anecdotally, this also happens in academic
philosophy—for instance, Jason Stanley reported that four of his articles re-
jected from multiple highly-ranked journals are now among the twenty most-
cited articles in those very journals since 2000.10 This phenomenon is further
illustrated by a study in which twelve articles were submitted to the same
highly-ranked psychology journals that already published them (Peters and
Ceci 1982). Of the nine that made it past desk-rejection, eight of the papers
were rejected without reviewers or editors realizing that the journal had al-
ready published them—in many cases on the basis of “serious methodological
flaws”.
How can we square the intuitive thought that prestigious journals will se-
lect the most competent reviewers with the empirical research and anecdotes
indicating that journal-solicited reviewers are highly unreliable? Although
we can only speculate, there are reasons to think that journal-solicited re-
viewers are likely to be more biased than average. First, insofar as journals
tend to commission comparatively accomplished reviewers, these reviewers
plausibly have particular biases. These may include a bias for their own
views and work (as they have a vested interest in their views remaining in-
fluential) and biases for particular arguments (e.g., by authors they admire
or are personally acquainted with).
Second, the journal-solicited peer review system arguably introduces its
own biases. First, when reviewers know that the journal they are reviewing
10https://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2015/09/stanley-on-peer-
review.html.
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for has a high rejection rate, their presumption may be that they should
recommend rejection unless they are convinced the paper is excellent. This
potentially lowers the risk of accepting bad papers but increases the risk
of rejecting good papers. Anecdotally, this is borne out in journal-solicited
peer review—as illustrated again by significant numbers of seminal economics
papers being rejected by journals. Second, journal editors plausibly have
grounds to err on the side of rejection as well, as publishing a bad paper may
harm the journal’s reputation. Finally, by explicitly selecting ‘specialists’
(people who have already published in the area) to review papers, journal-
solicited peer review runs a serious risk of groupthink. Indeed, consider two
causal antecedents of groupthink: group cohesiveness and insularity (Janis
1972). Both are arguably embedded in journal-solicited peer review insofar
as editors seek out specialist reviewers—individuals who have chosen to work
in a similar area, attend conferences together, and share unpublished work
among each other. Conversely, journal-solicited peer review does not appear
to regularly involve a practice empirical evidence suggests serves to prevent
groupthink: the stimulation of intellectual conflict (Turner and Pratkanis
1994) through the inclusion of outside perspectives (Janis 1972, pp. 209–
215). Because crowd-sourced peer review would not only invite more people
to review papers, but also give reviewers the opportunity to contest each
other’s reviews (see §7.3), it would be more likely to generate the kind of
intellectual conflict necessary for combating groupthink. Similar arguments
have been made by philosophers under the label of epistemic diversity: re-
searchers actively pursuing opposing theories or methodologies is often fruit-
ful (Feyerabend 1975, Lakatos 1978, Longino 1990, Kitcher 1993, Zollman
2010).
Thus, there are reasons to believe that, even if journal editors recruit
‘the best reviewers’ (which we have no clear empirical evidence for), journal-
solicited peer review introduces biases that are likely to be less pronounced or
more evenly distributed in a general population of readers in the discipline.
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The ‘beta’ experiment suggested at the end of §7.1 could help support (or
undermine) these claims.
To be clear, readers in the general academic population will tend to have
biases of their own. Like journal-solicited reviewers, they plausibly have
vested interests in advancing their own views, idiosyncrasies, and so on. The
point of our argument is not primarily that crowd-sourced reviewers are less
biased than journal-solicited reviewers. Our argument is (1) there is no clear
evidence that journal-solicited reviewers are more accurate or less biased than
the reviewer pool at large; (2) there is some anecdotal evidence they may
in fact be less accurate or more biased; but more importantly (3) whatever
biases there are in an academic population, our three jury theorems suggest
that in a larger jury, these biases tend to cancel each other out more. With
a small jury (e.g., two reviewers), distorting biases are much more likely to
produce the wrong verdict.
Consequently, we submit that there is no clear support for the proposition
that journal-solicited reviewers are more accurate in their judgments of paper
quality than academics at large. Given that the evidence is unclear, we
believe it is more appropriate to assume that accuracy and bias are randomly
distributed in an academic population—unless and until clear evidence is
provided to the contrary.
7.3 Failures of Independence in Crowd-Sourced Peer
Review?
Another worry is that the jury theorems hold only when votes are probabilis-
tically independent. This assumption seems plausible for journal-solicited
peer review: each reviewer judges a given paper without knowledge of what
other reviewers think. Conversely, with crowd-sourced peer review, one (in-
fluential) reviewer’s evaluation of a paper may affect others—potentially gen-
erating a snowball effect. When votes in a jury are correlated, the collective
competence of a jury may be lower than the competence of individual jurors
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(Kaniovski and Zaigraev 2011).
Our reply begins by noting some technical points. First, correlated votes
only undermine the Condorcet Jury Theorem when reviewer competence is
low and correlation between their opinions high (Kaniovski and Zaigraev
2011). Second, for the results in §5–6 to be undermined, an even stronger
condition needs to hold: the correlation needs to increase systematically
with the number of reviewers. If reviewer opinions are correlated but the
correlation coefficient is constant, the first and more important part of our
theorems—that the probability of a judgment close to the correct one in-
creases with the number of reviewers—still holds, even if the second part—
that this probability goes to one in the limit—fails. Third, as Estlund (1994)
points out, the mere fact that early reviewers might influence the opinion
of later reviewers is not necessarily inconsistent with probabilistic indepen-
dence of reviewer judgments. Estlund thus shows that the ‘correlation’ (in
the intuitive sense) induced by early influential reviewers need not entail the
specific type of correlation that would undermine our argument.
Questions about reviewer competence and correlation between their opin-
ions would ideally be settled empirically. As discussed earlier, the empirical
finding of low interrater reliability suggests that reviewer competence may
indeed be low. We are not aware of any empirical work on correlations among
reviewer opinions in a crowd-sourced model of peer review (perhaps the ‘beta’
experiment discussed in §7.1 could provide some). However, potentially rele-
vant evidence comes from recent studies using surveys and prediction markets
to see whether academics can predict the results of replications (Dreber et al.
2015, Camerer et al. 2016, 2018, Forsell et al. 2019). There is a close analogy
here, as the surveys measure individual academics’ opinions without informa-
tion about what others think (as in journal-solicited peer review) while the
prediction markets measure opinions in the presence of information about
others (like crowd-sourced peer review). The results provide reason for opti-
mism. Prediction markets tend to do at least as well as surveys, suggesting
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that information about other academics’ opinions does not introduce the sort
of correlation that undermines the benefits of large numbers.
We add some speculative reasons to doubt that the correlation of votes
under crowd-sourced peer review would be high, or that it would increase
with the number of reviewers. Academic training and incentives encourage
academics to evaluate and counter arguments they find unpersuasive. Con-
sider the kinds of discussions that occur in journals after an article or book is
published—e.g., John Rawls’ book A Theory of Justice. Some commentators
were highly critical of Rawls’ arguments (e.g., Hare 1973a,b, Nowell-Smith
1973, Barry 1973); others more sympathetic (e.g., Mandelbaum 1973). Schol-
ars then began debating each other on particular ‘flaws’ in Rawls’ book (e.g.,
Bedau 1975). Eventually, a general consensus emerged that Rawls’ work is
important yet flawed in particular ways. Crowd-sourced reviewers could be
expected to do something similar: present their own evaluations of a given
piece of work and contest others. Assuming such practices are central to
crowd-sourced peer review, ‘votes’ will tend to be poorly correlated.
Moreover, we expect expert reviewers in particular to form their opinions
independently. Recall that in §7.1 we introduced expert reviewers (based
on colleagues’ endorsements) whose scores potential readers may want to
consider separately as a way to guard against internet trolls. Now a genuine
expert cannot just be somebody who happens to have more true beliefs than
average about a domain: such a person would lack what has been called
contributory expertise in the literature (Collins et al. 2016). The contributory
expert must also know the methods and heuristics one ought to adopt to
reliably arrive at true beliefs about the topic (Licon 2012, p. 451). We take
it that knowledge of these methods is meant to make the contributory expert
someone whose beliefs are relatively independent of their peers, conditional
on the truth. This point is strengthened by Estlund (1994), who observes
that in the presence of even fairly high degrees of deference to influential
reviewers, the kind of reviewer independence needed for our theorems to
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apply can be maintained as long as reviewers add at least a modicum of
their own (truth-tracking) insight.
If this is granted, then at least the set of expert reviewers will satisfy the
independence condition, and hence all the conditions for our jury theorems to
apply. Assuming that the average number of expert reviewers under crowd-
sourced peer review is at least as high as the average number of reviewers
under journal-solicited peer review, it follows (at minimum) that basing one’s
opinion on the average expert reviewer score is better than basing one’s
opinion on journal-solicited peer review.
We also think that, barring cases of internet mobs, correlation among
non-expert reviewers will tend to be low, and so basing one’s opinion on the
overall average score is even better than basing one’s opinion on the average
expert reviewer score (as this will make for an even larger jury). Whether
we are right about this will become clear over time as we experiment with
crowd-sourced peer review.
8 Conclusion
We have argued that if the presuppositions which peer review is based upon
are correct, then three jury theorems suggest that an open, crowd-sourced
model of post-publication peer review would do better at directing researchers
towards better work. This leaves two major questions open. First, are the
presuppositions of peer review correct? The brief arguments we gave for
them here should be supplemented with more sustained, and often empirical,
socio-epistemic inquiry. However, it should be noted that if these presuppo-
sitions turn out to be false, journal-solicited peer review is arguably even less
defensible than our argument suggests. Second, is it actually desirable to
direct researchers towards the best work? This might seem good for individ-
ual researchers but that is not yet to argue for its socio-epistemic optimality
(Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011). We leave both these projects for future work.
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We conclude by noting that the practical difficulties with implementing
our proposal are substantial but not insurmountable. Online forums for pub-
lic peer review (such as the arXiv in physics) already exist, even serving as a
primary point of publication in some fields. It is not beyond our capacities to
add the necessary features on some expanded version of these venues. What
is presently lacking is the will. We thus hope that our paper goes towards
building this will, such that researchers will become able to take further and
more systematic advantage of the combined wisdom of the academic com-
munity.
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